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Apportionment and Contribution of 
Workers' Compensation Benefits 
by Mathew D. Staver, Esq. 
The apportionment of benefits be-
tween a claimant and a carrier and 
contribution of benefits between 
multiple carriers has been a confus-
ing area oflaw which has generated 
conflicting appellate court opinions. 
Florida Statutes §440.15(5)(a) states 
as follows regarding apportionment 
between an employee and a carrier: 
The fact that an employee has suffer-
ed previous disability, impairment, 
anomaly, or disease, or received compen-
sation therefor, shall not preclude the 
employee fram benefits far a subsequent 
aggravation or acceleration of a pre-ex-
isting condition nor preclude benefits far 
death resulting therefrom, except that no 
benefits shall be payable if the employee, 
at the time of' entering into the employ-
ment of the employer by whom the ben-
efits would otherwise be payable, falsely 
represents himself as not having previ-
ously been disabled or compensated be-
cause of such previous disability, im-
pairment, anomaly, or disease. Compen-
sation far temporary disability, medical 
benefits, and wage loss benefits shall not 
be subject to apportionment. 
Florida Statutes § 440.42(3) re-
garding contribution of responsibil-
ity between carriers states as follows: 
Where there is any controversy as to 
which of two or more carriers is liable for 
the discharge of the obligations and du-
ties of one or more employers with re-
spect to a claim for compensation. reme-
dial treatment. or other benefits under 
this chapter, the Judge of Compensation 
Claims shall have jurisdiction to adjudi-
C8 te such controversy; and if one of the 
·carriers voluntarily or in compliat).ce 
with the compensation order makes pay-
ments and discharges such liability and 
it is finally determined that another car-
rieris liable for all or part of such obliga-
tions and duties with respect to such 
claim. the carrier which has made pay-
ments either voluntarily.or in compliance 
with the compensation order shall be 
entitled to reimbursement from the car-
rier finally determined liable and the 
Judge of Compensation Claims shall 
. have jurisdiction to order such reim-
bursement; however, if the carrier finally 
determined liable can demonstrate that 
it has been prejudiced by lack of knowl-
edge or notice of its potential liability. 
such reimbursement shall be only with 
respect to payments made after it had 
knowledge or notice of its potentialliabil-
ity. . 
Though Section 440.15(5)(a) gov-
erns issues between a claimant and 
an EtC, it may also be raised in cases 
involving controversies between 
multiple carriers.' This article will 
seek to explore the differences be-
tween Florida Statutes §440. 15(5)(a) 
in Section 440.42(3).After discussing 
the differences, this article will then 
focus on the multiple applications of 
Section 440.42(3), the section dealing 
with contribqtion of responsibility 
between carriers.2 
A. Claimant vs. Carrier 
Cases involving pre-existing con-
ditions fall into the following three 
categories: (I) an injury which re-
sults directly and solely from the in-
dustrial accident and which would 
have occurred even in the absence of 
the pre-existing condition; (2) an in-
jury resulting from the industrial 
accident accelerating or aggravating 
a pre-existing condition; and ·(3) a 
condition which results from the nor-
mal progress of a pre-existing condi-
tion and which would have existed 
had the industrial accident never 
occurred. Disability falling with-
in the first two categories is 
compensable but disability falling 
within the third category is not 
compensable.' 
Section 440.15(a) prohibits a car-
rier from apportioning benefits if at 
the time of the industrial accident 
the claimant had (1) a permanent 
pre-existing condition, (2) which is 
aggravated or accelerated by the in-
dustrial accident. Ifboth criteria are 
met, then the carrier cannot appor-
tion temporary disability, medical 
benefits, or wage loss benefits. If the 
claimant's pre-existing condition is 
not permanent in nature, or if that 
.condition has not been aggravated or 
accelerated by the industrial acci-
dent, then Section 440.15(a) does not 
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prohibit a carrier from apportioning 
out the pre-existing condition. 
B. Prior vs. Subsequent Carrier 
Section 440.42(3) allows the Judge 
of Compensation Claims to require 
one carrier to reimburse another car-
rier based on shared liability for the 
claimant's condition. Though com-
monly referred to as apportionment 
between carriers, it is more accu-
rately described as contribution or 
reimbursement between carriers. . 
1. Claimant Not at MMI Prior to 
Subsequent Accident 
If the claimant has not reached 
maximum medical improvement 
("MMI") from the prior carrier's ac-
cident at the time of the subsequent 
injury, then the prior carrier may 
seek reimbursement or contribution 
of liability against the subsequent 
carrier. Since in this case the claim-
ant suffers a subsequent accident, 
the claimant cannot raise Section 
440.15(a) against the prior carrier. 
The prior carrier may seek reim-
bursement or contribution from the 
subsequent carrier even before the 
claimant reaches MMI from the sub-
sequent accident. Thus, the prior car-
rier can request reimbursement for 
temporary and medical benefits. Ap-
portionment for permanent benefits 
must await the claimant's reaching 
MMI from the subsequent injury.' 
2. Claimant Reached MMI Prior to 
Subsequent Accident 
If at the time of the subsequent 
accident the claimant had already 
reached MMI from the prior injury, 
the prior carrier may still seek reim-
bursement from the subsequent car· 
rier. Just like the situation where the 
claimant had not yet reached MMI 
at the time of the subsequent acci-
dent, the prior carrier may seek re-
imbursement for any temporary and 
medical benefits which the prior car-
rier is responsible for paying. The 
prior carrier must await the claim-
ant reaching MMI from the subse-
quent accident prior to seeking reim-
bursement from the subsequent 
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carrier of permanent benefits.Again, 
a claimant cannot raise Section 
440.15(a) against a prior carrier from 
seeking reimbursement against a 
subsequent carrier. 
C. Subsequent vs. Prior Carrier 
Whenever a subsequent carrier 
seeks reimbursement against a prior 
carrier, two other statutory provi-
sions come into play. In some circum-
stances a claimant-may raise Section 
440.15(a) to prohibit certain appor-
tionment of benefits, and in other 
cases, Section 440.49 dealing with 
the Special Disability Trust Fund 
lays out policy reasons for prohibit-
ing certain forms of contribution. 
1. Claimant Not at MMI Prior to 
Subsequent Accident 
Ifat the time of the claimant's sub-
sequent accident the claimant had 
not yet reached MMI from the prior 
accident, then Section 440.15(a) does 
not bar a subsequent carrier from 
obtaining reimbursement from a 
prior carrier. Section 440.42(3) al-
lows a subsequent earner to seek re-
imbursement against a prior carrier 
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and this reimbursement or contribu-
tion is not barred by Section 
440.15(a) which prohibits apportion-
ment of temporary and medical ben-
efits. As noted above, in order for 
Section 440.15(a) to prohibit appor-
tionment of benefits between a 
claimant and a carrier, the claimant 
must have a permanent condition 
(which requires a finding of MMI) at 
the time of the accident and the con-
dition must have been aggravated or 
accelerated by the industrial acci-
dent. Here the claimant has not 
reached MMI and therefore the sub-
sequent carrier may not only appor-
tion benefits against the claimant 
but require the prior carrier to reim-
burse the subsequent carrier for tem-
porary and medical benefits. Once 
the claimant reaches MMI from the 
subsequent accident, the subsequent 
carrier can also require the prior car-
rier to reimburse permanent ben-
efits. Again, the subsequent carrier 
does not need to wait until the claim- · 
an t reaches MMI from the subse-
quent accident prior to seeking reim-
bursement for temporary and 
medical benefits.' 
2. Claimant Reached MMI Prior to 
Subsequent Accident 
If at the time of the subsequent 
accident the claimant has already 
<',. ;'. 
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reached MMI from the prior acci-
dent, and if the subsequent accident 
aggravates or accelerates this p!e-
existing condition, then Section 
440.15(a) may act as a barto the sub-
sequent carrier's apportionment of 
benefits against the claimant.· 
a . Merger ofInjuries 
If the claimant has a pre-existing 
permanent condition at the time of 
the subsequent accident which is 
temporarily aggravated or acceler-
ated by the subsequent accident, 
then the subsequent carrier may be 
responsible for the temporary and 
medical benefits during the peri.od of 
temporary acceleration or aggrava-
tion. 
If the subsequent accident results 
in a permanent aggravation or accel-
eration of the claimant's previous 
permanent condition, then the sub-
sequent carrier may be responsible 
for all of the permanent and medical. 
benefits. The recourse of the subse-
quent carrier is to seek reimburse-
ment, not from the prior carrier, but 
from the Special Disability Trust 
Fund. See Florida Statute § 440.49. 7 
b. No Merger ofInjuries 
If at the time of the subsequent 
accident the claimant h1l.s reached 
MMI from the prior accident, but the 
subsequent accident has not merged 
with the prior condition to result in 
an acceleration or aggravation of 
that pre-existing condition, then Sec-
tion 440.15(a) cannot be used to pro-
hibit the subsequent carrier from 
apportioning benefits. Section 
440.42(3) would allow a subsequent 
carrier to seek contribution or reim-
bursement from the prior carrier. 
Since there was no merger, the sub-
sequent carrier cannot seek reim-
bursement from the Special Disabil-
ity Trust Fund. This situation 
therefore represents the third factor 
noted above in Evans, namely that 
portion of the claimant's condition 
which is due to the normal progress 
of the pre-existing condition which 
would have existed even in the ab-
sence of the subsequent accident is 
not compensable. Therefore, as it re-
lates to the subsequent carrier, that 
portion of the condition is not the 
responsibility of the subsequent car-
riet. This portion of the condition is 
eithe'r related to the prior accident, 
or is not related to work at all. At any 
rate, the subsequent carrier need not 
bear any responsibility for that por-
tion of the condition which does not 
merge with the subsequent accident 
and which would have existed in the 
absence of the subsequent accident.' 
D. Determining Apportionment 
and Contribution·Ratio 
1. Apportionment Ratio 
For a carrier to apportion out of an 
accident its responsibility to a claim-
ant, the carrier must identify that 
part of the claimant's illness which 
has not been aggravated nor acceler-
ated by the industrial accident. For 
example, if a claimant sustains a 
back injury related to work, the car-
rier need not pay for the claimant's 
pre-existing vision impairment so 
long as this condition is not acceler-
ated or aggravated by the industrial 
accident. There may be an occasion 
where the carrier may have to tem-
porarily pay for the condition if it is 
temporarily aggravated by the in-
dustrial accident or requires treat-
ment in order to treat the underly-
ing industrial accident.' 
2. Contribution Ratio 
When requiring contribution or 
reimbursement between carriers of 
temporary and medi.cal benefits, a 
judge must determine the ratio of 
each accident in terms of its impact 
on the claimant's temporary disabil-
ity or need for medical benefits. 
Once the claimant reaches MMI 
and is assigned a permanent impair-
ment to the prior accident and an 
additional permanent impairment to 
the subsequent accident, ajudge may 
not use the ratio of impairments as 
the ratio of disability." In other 
words if the claimant has a 10% per-marie~t impairment, 5% attributable 
to the prior accident and 5% to the 
subsequent accident ajudge may not 
on this basis alone apportion 50% of 
the condition to the prior carrier and 
50% to the subsequent carrier. A 
judge must apportion based 0I?- dis-
ability and not impairment. 
E. Death Benefits 
The discussion above regarding 
apportionment and contribution does 
not apply to death benefits. The rea-
son is that it is virtually impossible 
to determine what portion of a con-
dition actually caused the claimant's 
death. In most situations, the subse-
quent accident will in all probability 
be totally liable for the claimant's 
death." 
Summary 
Section 440.15(a) prevents the 
carrier from apportioning benefits if 
the claimant, at the time of the acci-
dent, had a permanent pre-existing 
condition which is aggravated or ac-
celerated by the industrial accident. 
Section 440.42(3) allows contribution 
of benefits between carriers for re-
sponsibility to the same claimant for 
different accidents. Contribution of 
these benefits may be adjudicated 
before or after the claimant reaches 
MMI. Contribution between carriers 
generally takes the form of the prior 
carrier seeking contribution from the 
subsequent carrier, However, when a 
claimant sustains an injury by a 
prior carrier and incurs a second in· 
jury by a subsequent carrier prior to 
reaching MMI from the first acci-
dent, the subsequent carrier may 
seek contribution against the prior 
carrier or apportionment against the 
clahnant. Contribution or apportion-
ment is permissible because the 
claimant had not reached MMI, and 
therefore did not have a permanent 
condition at the time of the subse-
quent accident. Finally, in cases 
where a claimant has reached MMI 
prior to the accident under coverage 
by the subsequent carrier, contribu-
tion is not permissible when the two 
accidents have merged. The recourse 
is for the subsequent carrier to be 
reimbursed from the Special Disabil-
ity Trust Fund. 
However, if there is no merger be-
tween the accidents, then a subse-
quent carrier is not responsible for 
the claimant's condition not related 
to the industrial accident. 
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